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Feeling secure or being secure?  
Why it can seem better not to protect yourself against a 
natural hazard 
 
Abstract 
This article presents qualitative research in flood risk areas of England that suggests that 
the desire to feel secure can sometimes deter people from taking actions that would 
reduce the actual physical damage of a hazardous natural event. That is, it argues that 
people sometimes put what Giddens calls their ontological security above their physical 
security. Preferring to think of their homes as places that are innately safe, they reject the 
idea of defending them; preferring to think of nature as a positive moral force, they 
hesitate to view it as a source of real danger; and preferring to think of society as a 
competent protector of last resort, they are reluctant to accept the need to protect 
themselves. Being central to ontological security, such social representations (of „home‟, 
„nature‟, „society‟ etc.) are defended by avoiding perceptual shifts and behaviours that 
might challenge them. This paper discusses how and why they are defended, what 
happens when they become indefensible and why some householders and groups of 
householders are more willing than others to take self-protective actions against risks 
such as flooding.
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Feeling secure or being secure?  
 
Why it can seem better not to protect yourself against a 
natural hazard 
  
Although 60% of at-risk residents in England and Wales claim to be aware that they live 
in a flood risk area, only 6% of those with no experience of flooding have taken any 
action to prepare for floods and reduce possible damage, and this figure only rises to 39% 
for those who do have flood experience (Harries 2008). This paper asks why that should 
be the case and asks why some people do not implement measures to mitigate the risks 
posed by natural hazards even when they are aware of the existence of the risk and of 
steps they could take to reduce it.  
 
The paper argues that people‟s apparently irrational refusal to prepare for flooding is 
functional when seen in the context of their own motivational priorities. Preparatory 
measures against hypothetical future flooding are eschewed, it argues, when they are seen 
to threaten the fundamental human need to feel secure.  
 
A useful starting point for thinking about this question is Maslow‟s (1943) hierarchy of 
motivation (see Figure 1). According to Maslow, people prioritise some categories of 
need over others. Physiological needs and material safety, for example, take priority over 
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what he calls esteem needs, and perceived threats to the former will always be dealt with 
first. This hierarchy provides a useful conceptual framework for this discussion, and the 
„pyramid‟ in which the hierarchy is often presented provides a useful visual image.  
 
This discussion considers what happens when different threats apply within different 
temporal and epistemological frames of reference. What if one threat is perceived as 
certain and as applying in the immediate term, while another is perceived as doubtful and 
as applying only in the longer-term? More specifically, does the same hierarchy of need 
apply if protection of physical safety against a hypothetical natural hazard conflicts with 
the protection, in the immediate term, of needs that Maslow described as less 
fundamental? Evidence from interviews with householders in UK flood-risk areas 
suggests that it does not.  
 
The rejection of flood-risk mitigation measures – and indeed, of the whole discourse of 
flood-risk mitigation – occurs, the research suggests, because they are perceived as 
endangering other needs that are more immediate and pressing. Thus, behaviour that 
might at first glance seem somewhat irrational is actually based on a more sophisticated 
version of the hierarchy presented by Maslow, and can be seen as entirely rational.  
 
Figure 1 Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs 
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Flood hazard in the UK 
 
The conclusions outlined above were drawn from research looking at the responses to a 
particular natural hazard – flooding.  
 
Although flood events are still relatively rare and small-scale in the UK, over 1.5 million 
people in England and Wales have a greater than 1 in 75 annual chance of experiencing a 
flood (Evans et al 2004) and recent flooding in Hull, Sheffield, Gloucester and 
Tewkesbury (2007), Carlisle (2005) and Boscastle (2004) have kept flooding in the 
public eye and near the top of the public policy agenda. Furthermore, climate change, the 
urbanisation of river catchment areas and the growing trend to build on at-risk, brown-
field sites are likely to increase the exposure to such risks (Evans et al 2004, McCarthy et 
al 2001, Smith & Ward 1998, Environment Agency 2003).  
 
Floods can have a significant impact on households. Financially, the average damage 
amounts to £30,000 per home (RPA et al 2003). A third of all flood-victims also report 
long-term adverse physical affects (ibid, Tapsell et al 1999, WHO 2002, Tapsell et al 
2002) and the anxiety, relationship strain and general disruption that comes in the wake 
of flooding is associated with increases in mental ill-health (Tunstall et al 2006, Tapsell 
et al 2003, Tapsell & Tunstall 2001).  
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Faced with these impacts and the likely growth in the frequency and severity of flooding, 
the UK Government is trying to encourage householders to adopt measures that limit 
damage floods to individual homes. The success of these efforts, however, has so far 
been moderate at best.  
 
In trying to explain the failure of individual to protect themselves against known threats, 
researchers have traditionally focussed on the question of risk perception and have argued 
that if lay-people are not responding to natural hazards in the way that experts advise 
them, then they must have a distorted perception of the risks of flooding
1
. If this distorted 
perception were corrected, they claim, behaviour would change. The frequent failure of 
public education campaigns to have a significant impact on hazard-response (see Kates 
1962; Sims & Bauman 1983) has, however, called into question the validity of this 
perspective, and there is a growing realisation that people‟s understandings of hazards are 
the result of a process of social construction and not simply of perception and information.  
 
The Research 
 
The research outlined in this paper set out to understand that social construction of 
natural hazards. Sponsored by the Economic & Social Research Council and the 
Environment Agency for England and Wales, it involved semi-structured interviews and 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Bostram et al (1992) and Atman et al (1994), who seek to identify gaps and 
misconceptions in people's understandings of risk situations in order that these can be 'corrected'. 
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focus groups with forty householders – some of whom had experienced floods, others of 
whom had not; some of whom were owner-occupiers and others of whom were tenants; 
and all of whom were aware that their homes were at risk of flooding.  
 
Sampling for the research was purposive. In this form of sampling the aim is not to create 
a statistically representative sample but rather to provide adequate coverage of the most 
salient demographic criteria, which in this case were housing tenure and social grade. 
Fieldwork areas were selected to facilitate this sample design. Thus, one of the four 
fieldwork areas consisted entirely of social housing, one consisted of mixed housing and 
three were dominated by owner-occupied homes. To further ensure as diverse a range of 
participants as possible, participants were recruited in person, on the doorstep, and were 
offered the choice of either an interview in their own home or a focus group at a local 
venue. As an extra incentive, a small cash gift was also offered in return for participation. 
In the achieved sample, almost half of respondents were from social grades A and B, 
about 15% were from social grades C1 and C2 and about a third were from social grades 
D and E.  About two-fifths were tenants. 
For a full discussion of the methods used, see Harries (2008). 
To uncover the meaning structures that shaped these respondents‟ talk about flood risk, 
transcripts were analysed using what Fairclough (2003: 2) calls “textually orientated 
discourse analysis”. This approach is founded on a tradition in linguistics that sees 
language as functional as well as communicative – as constituting reality, rather than just 
describing it (see Wittgenstein 1958, Austin 1962, Halliday 1973, 1994; also Potter and 
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Wetherell 1987). A discourse, in this conception, comprises the working assumptions that 
make life possible without being the subject of everyday reflection or conversation.  
Drawing on ideas from Hajer (1995, 2002), Fairclough (2003) and Moscovici (1961, 
1984), a „discourse‟ is defined as: 
 
an ensemble of ideas, concepts, categories and social representations through which meaning is given 
to physical and social realities, and which is realised through the linguistic features of spoken and 
written texts. 
Findings 
Few householders in this research express much concern about the protection of their 
physical safety or of their homes and possessions. What stands out, rather, is the desire to 
protect what Giddens (1991) calls ontological security.  
 
According to Giddens, an ontologically secure person is someone who is free from 
existential doubts and who is able to believe that life will continue in much the same way 
as it always has – without threat to the familiar representations of time, space and identity. 
This research suggests that this sense of security is sometimes protected by a 
representational barrier through which information about the world is interpreted and 
whose function is to prevent hostile representations from upsetting the comforting 
balance of existing assumptions about that world. By dint of this barrier, people are able 
to “cause the world to be what [they] think it is or ought to be” (Moscovici 1961: p57). 
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The use of this barrier could be described as an attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1957) or as an example of the psychoanalytical phenomenon of denial. In this 
paper, however, the theoretical framework of social representations theory is used. This 
relates the phenomenon more closely to the social constructionist paradigm and draws 
attention to the particular constructions that keep this sense of security intact. 
 
The paragraphs that follow describe the representations that appear in the data – the 
representations of „home‟, „society‟ and „nature‟ – and the role they play in protecting 
ontological security. It is also argued that the desire to preserve these representations de-
legitimises the discourse of pre-emptive action and is therefore one explanation for the 
lack of householder action to mitigate flood risk. 
 
The descriptions that follow use quotations from the interviews and focus groups to 
illustrate the use of the representations. For the benefit of the reader, and in the cause of 
brevity, the quotes included here provide the clearest and most overt demonstrations of 
the uses of the representations. More subtle examples of their use are not shown, for these 
would need lengthier commentary and the use of additional linguistic terminology that 
would also need to be explained. It should be noted, however, that not all householders in 
the sample used these representational barriers to the same extent, and that some, indeed, 
showed little sign of using them at all, seemed to have accepted the existence of the flood 
risk and were focussing on measures to reduce the potential material damage rather than 
on measures to protect their feeling of security.  
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The representation of „home‟ 
Of these representations, the most essential for the argument being made here is that of 
„home‟. 
 
In Western societies, a representation of „home‟ that includes the notions of continuity, 
safety, relaxation, privacy and familial affection symbolises, for many, the centre of their 
lives (Cooper 1976, Haraven 1993, Mallett 2004, Saunders 1989, Smith 1994). This 
idealised representation of „home‟ remains important even where, as is often the case 
(Fitchet 1989, Mallett 2004, Douglas 1991), it does not reflect the lived experience. As 
people spend time in a house or flat, the routines they develop there, the aspects of their 
identities that they project onto the fabric of the building and the accretion of personal 
and inter-personal memories all imbue the place with their sense of who they are (Tuan 
1974). Some writers, indeed, give „home‟ a religious significance, seeing man‟s image of 
himself in his home as a metaphor for God‟s position in heaven. The home, from this 
perspective, is a fixed and sacred spot from which a person can create a version of the 
universe that fits in with his desires (see Cooper 1976). Any invasion of the home 
therefore undermines ontological security (Dupuis & Thorns 1998), and the temporary 
loss of home due to forced relocation after flooding is associated with deterioration in 
mental health (Ohl & Tapsell 2000, Tapsell et al 1999). 
 
Amongst the sample in this study, the importance of representations of „home‟ reveals 
itself in a reluctance to consider mitigation measures that would lessen the visual 
conformity of their homes to an idealised norm. The two following excerpts illustrate 
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this. The first is taken from an interview with a 46 year-old professional married 
homeowner who, two years previously, had come home to find that a sudden flash-flood 
had washed through the ground floor of her home. The second is from a focus group with 
home-owning professionals, who had also been affected by flash flooding.  
 
Interviewer […] If you were able to do things you could just leave in place and forget about… I don‟t 
know what that might be. It might be… raising your doorway for example; your floor a 
little bit; taking some measure permanently. Would that be better? 
Martha Probably – if, let‟s say, um, cost permitting. And also, I think we don‟t really want to 
(pause) change it – I like my house to look nice – I don‟t want to have a door that is like a 
bit daft because I raise the (laugh). And each time when we have friends or people 
coming through, you say well, you know, „can you please step higher‟ (laughter). That 
just, um – I don‟t know. 
 
Charles Another thing. Our next-door neighbour has lived in the same house for really ages. They 
put in a cellar door because some of the water came from the road and went down the 
cellar stairs in front of the house. They put in a door, the sort of thing they use, you see in 
a submarine (Sally laughs) …that you can seal 
Terry With a hatch 
Charles You know, so it‟s got 
Phillip The full rotary…  
Charles [lots of laughter obliterates speech] 
Terry     A periscope! 
 
In both cases, the idea of making a home appear at all „unusual‟ seems to provoke 
discomfort. A home, the respondents seem to be saying, should look „nice‟ and not „daft‟. 
 12 
It should conform to what one expects of a home and should not have doorways that 
oblige you to “step higher” or cellar doors like the doors “you see in a submarine”. 
Without these homely characteristics, I suggest, domiciles cease to possess the 
comforting characteristics that are associated with „home‟; if the visual imagery is lost, 
then so is the entire representation – including the elements that provide the emotional 
security. 
 
A third excerpt is taken from a focus group of working class respondents: Marc, an 
owner-occupier with living space in the basement; Freddy, a council tenant with his 
bedroom in the basement of his flat, and Pat, who lives in a terraced council house: 
 
Interviewer […] I mean someone I spoke to […] he got this big whacking board that he can screw in 
across his front door. So it's cheaper. I don't know what it cost him – probably a hundred 
Quid or something like that – um… 
Marc Yeah but then again, you'd feel like a prisoner (laughter) – a prisoner in your own home 
init (laughter)! 
Pat yeah, prisoner in your own home! 
Marc prisoner in your own home (laughter) […] you might get squatters moving in while 
you're out!  (Laughter)  
Freddy the trouble is, you've got no flood coming in, but then a fire starts and you've had it!  
(Laughter) 
 
Here, the respondents again defend the concept of the home as a place of conformity to 
norms, but they also represent „home‟ as a place of safety and comfort. The idea of 
barring the gateway between home and the rest of the world is interpreted as restricting 
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freedom (“prisoner in your own home”) and inviting invasion (“you might get squatters 
moving in”) and danger (“then a fire starts and you‟ve had it!”).  
 
The laughter and hyperbole that characterise this excerpt are common to a number of the 
interviews. Although laughter is by nature ambiguous (Gregory 1999; Mulkay 1988), it 
seems in these passages to be what Konrad Lorenz calls “a controlled form of 
aggression” (cited in Morreall 1983 p6). It is employed, it appears, as a rhetorical means 
to ridicule invasive, alien representations of the respondents‟ homes that might threaten 
their own representations of „home‟ as somewhere safe. The use of hyperbole, meanwhile, 
enhances the opportunities for this process of ridicule by exaggerating the incongruity 
between the idealised concept of „home‟ and the alien concepts being mooted2.  
 
The case, above, of the two council tenants raises the question of tenure and its influence 
on flood-risk response. For home-owners, „home‟ represents financial capital and is 
therefore of more than just symbolic value – particularly for those who envisage selling 
in the near future, for whom conformity to social norms has implications for saleability as 
well as for value (“Anyone sees that [floodgate] on your house, they ain‟t buying!”).  
 
There are a number of possible reasons why, as Grothman & Reusswig (2005) have 
shown, tenants are less likely than owner-occupiers to take measures to protect their 
homes. Firstly, they are unlikely to have the right to make the structural alterations 
necessary for measures such as drainage-improvement or floodgates and have less 
incentive to do so because they are not financially responsible for structural damage. 
                                                 
2
 According to Morreall (1983), incongruity is an important aspect of much humour. 
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Secondly, there is also likely to be a different representation of „home‟. Comments by 
housing association residents suggest that arrangements inside the home can be the locus 
of resistance for people who feel disempowered by a lack of control over the outside of 
their homes. In this situation, suggestions made by out-groups regarding internal 
resilience measures
3
 are likely to be resisted in the name of in-group identity and status. 
 
The representation of „society‟ 
In most of the modern, Western world, „society‟ – and its representative, the state – are 
represented as one of the main guarantors of the security of people‟s homes. The 
representation of society, therefore, plays an important role in protecting people‟s 
ontological security against natural hazards. If they can continue to represent „society‟ as 
essentially just and effective – as providing rescue and recompense, or better still, as 
preventing destructive events from ever occurring – then they can continue to believe in 
the possibility of a home that is safe and can continue to feel ontologically secure.  
 
This is illustrated by Freddy, an unemployed market trader. Freddy has been flooded 
twice in the last four years and was on each occasion obliged to evacuate his flat for 
several months. As a result, he says, he became depressed; and he would “go crazy if it 
happened again”. As the following passage shows, he protects his fragile sense of 
ontological security by clinging to a representation of society that pictures it as both able 
and desirous to eliminate the flood-risk that is threatening his home and security: 
                                                 
3
 For example, the use of removable rugs instead of fitted carpets. 
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Interviewer But what I'm really interested in, is who you think is responsible for protecting your place 
from flood. Is it the council, or is it you, the tenants? 
Freddy Right, well it's… it's two people… it is two people: it's [the local] council and it‟s [the 
water board]. 
Interviewer How about, how about… Some people would say that if there is no way of stopping the 
flooding, then maybe the people themselves should try to stop the water getting in. 
Pat Yeah, but how can you blame the tenants! 
Interviewer Aaah! 
Freddy It‟s up to them to stop the damage really, cos… 
Pat They should be cleaning the gullies! 
Freddy …cos, everyone in this area told them exactly what the problem was [unclear]. The 
gulley cleaning should be carried out regularly. 
Pat Regularly; yeah.  
Interviewer So if nothing was going to happen to stop the flooding, would you actually want to try to 
find out about other things that you could do? Or is it totally the council that's got to do 
something? 
Pat No; it's the council. 
Freddy Yes, I think it's the council too. It‟s their problem. It's up to them to keep the buildings at 
the standard and all that. 
Interviewer But it's your videos and your carpets that are getting trashed, isn't it. 
Freddy Yeah. 
Interviewer Cos, like, the council doesn't lose out by the sound of it. I'm quite amazed really. It 
sounds like they just lose 500 Quid – which they pay you – and that's it. 
Freddy Yeah. You know, I think that sooner or later one of the systems is going to realise what's 
going on. Some judge somewhere is going to notice this and is going to make them sort it 
out. 
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The passage illustrates how patterns of cause, blame and solution can be constructed that 
exonerate the speaker without destroying the representation of the state as the final 
protector of the home and the individual. Although Freddy blames one part of the state 
for not preventing the flood (“it's [the local] Council and it‟s [the water board]”), this 
blaming of one part of the state system co-exists with an image of society as a whole as 
retaining the capacity and the desire to eliminate the risk (“sooner or later […] some 
judge […] is going to make them sort it out”). The state‟s failure to protect his home is 
represented as an aberration rather than a defining characteristic. For Freddy, although 
there might be oversights and injustices, the state remains fundamentally dependable, for 
these will always be put right, eventually, by “some judge” or by “one of the systems”. 
 
Few respondents display this rhetorical construction as clearly as Freddy does. The 
frequent use of the discourse of blame amongst the other householders in the sample, 
however, implies its wider presence. Blaming a body implies that it retains the capacity to 
behave otherwise, and even that – in the normal course of things – it should behave 
otherwise. It suggests, in other words, a representation of society and the state as 
fundamentally just and competent – in spite of the failure to prevent a particular 
occurrence of flooding.   
The representation of „nature‟ 
A final pillar of support for the phenomenological safety of „home‟ is the representation 
of nature as a force that is essentially benign.  
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Although it is increasingly being challenged by the global warming discourse, this 
representation is still predominant in the West, where „nature‟ is still generally 
represented as a realm of positive moral influence (Macnaghten & Urry 1995; Soper 
1995) and the destructive aspects of its character are not usually treated as part of the 
normal spectrum of man-environment relations (see Hewitt 1995). In spite, therefore, of 
being aware of recent natural disasters such as the New Year tsunami in Asia and the 
flash flood in Boscastle, most respondents still represent the role of „nature‟ in their own 
lives as essentially positive. As the following passages illustrate, such a representation 
makes flooding seem less threatening:  
 
George I‟d sooner have water [than burglary] I think. 
Interviewer How comes? 
[Over-talking – not transcribed] 
George It‟s a natural phenomenon, isn‟t it. 
Margaret You can‟t help that.  
George Water, to me, it‟s natural – apart from all the buildings created it – you might say. 
Interviewer Yeah, yeah. 
George It‟s a normal… natural phenomenon, I think – flooding. It‟s from rain and flood, isn‟t it. 
Act of God you could… Would that just about cover it? […] 
 
George and Margaret‟s cottage is regularly threatened by flooding. Asked why he would 
sooner be flooded than experience a burglary, George‟s answer (“It‟s a natural 
phenomenon isn‟t it”) carries an implication that “natural” is better4, and the construction 
                                                 
4 That is, if he is adhering to the co-operative principles (Grice 1975) that usually govern conversations, 
according to which spoken contributions should be relevant to the context. The relevance of the statement 
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of equivalences between „natural‟ and “act of God” and between “natural” and “normal” 
indicate a representation of natural events as relatively benign.  
 
The perceived moral neutrality of „natural‟ seems to render flooding more acceptable. 
George‟s suggestion that burglary is less acceptable than flooding because of the 
presence of intent and malice is echoed by other respondents. As one respondent – a 
retired academic – indicates, floods that are attributed to people are more detrimental to 
the feeling of security than floods that are attributed to nature (which, in the following 
passage, is equated with „God‟): 
 
Florence […] Then they started to think about regulating the flooding and opening and shutting the 
doors of the Thames and that; and I must say that since then, I personally have felt that it 
was no longer an act of God which was happening, but controlled by the powers that be. 
In other words, the last [time] – was it two years ago…? 
Nigel Two years. 
Florence We weren‟t there. Erm, we were actually all in [European city], but my son returned for 
New Year – earlier than us. He doesn‟t live here anymore but, um, he spent the weekend 
controlling things here. Erm, and we didn‟t get flooded inside, but we felt that whoever it 
was, had decided to flood us rather than flood the centre of Reading. So my perception is 
now – from fatalistic, before: „floods will happen; the river is a risk; we‟re ready to take 
it‟… Because up to, you know, for about 30 years, we could see the water rising and then 
decreasing, but I would say that over the last ten years I‟ve become a bit cynical, in the 
sense that I felt much more regulated by a central flooding control. Which means that if 
they decide to flood us, they will. Even if, erm, naturally the water would spread down in 
                                                                                                                                                 
is not evident in its semantic content, so it must be implied. The most obvious implication would seem to 
be that something that is natural is better than something that is not. 
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[name of town] or [inaudible], but they‟ve obviously… And we heard it said that they 
decided not to flood the centre of [name of their town] because there was generators, 
there was electricity generators and therefore we‟ve… I felt – although I wasn‟t there, but 
I was ready to come back – a lot more insecure. 
 
Florence‟s construction of the causality of floods – like George‟s construction of the 
nature of floods – limits the damage to ontological security by blaming the more 
threatening floods on human intervention and preserving the representation of „nature‟ as 
benign. Flood-risk is represented as a threat to ontological security only as long as people 
continue their malign interference. If left to behave “naturally” rising river levels would 
“spread down” to other localities and Florence‟s home would suffer no adverse affects. It 
is human interventions that disturb the natural system and put her house at risk. Seen 
from within this set of representations, Florence‟s home is not inherently at risk, for the 
situation will change as soon as mankind begins to behave with greater morality. 
 
This tendency to attribute more „risky‟ floods to people rather than to nature is evident 
throughout the sample and is independent of the type of respondent or the source of the 
floods – rivers, groundwater, sewers etc. Blame is not the result of perceived causality; 
nor does it vary greatly with demography. Rather, it is a convenient tool for the 
protection of a particular representation of „nature‟ and the security that this 
representation allows.  
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When the representations fail 
Householders‟ sense of security therefore becomes dependent on this particular 
representation of „nature‟ – as also on the representations of „home‟ and of „society‟ 
discussed above. To acknowledge that your home is not safe, that society will not always 
protect you against floods and that nature is not always benign, is to enter a 
phenomenological territory where material security is no longer certain and new anxieties 
must be faced. For this reason, householders hold tenaciously to their familiar 
representations. 
 
Only when they have a number of first-hand experiences of a natural hazard affecting 
their home do householders seem to relinquish these representations. However, although 
for some this leads to more protective behaviour and hence to greater material safety, for 
others the loss of ontological security leads only to greater distress.  
 
The first of these two outcomes has long been recognised in the literature, which 
highlights experience of a natural hazard as one of the strongest predictors of mitigating 
action against that hazard (Penning-Rowsell 1976; Sattler et al 2000; Lindell & Perry 
2000; Grothman & Reusswig 2006). We see this illustrated in this study too, where 
George and Mary – who have repeatedly been flooded – acknowledge that their home is 
at risk from flooding; acknowledge that they do not like the fact that this risk exists, but 
represent themselves as able to cope with it (“It‟s part of life really. [Pause] We do 
accept things quite well, don‟t we?”) and take measures to mitigate its impact. 
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The second outcome, however, is less positive. Some respondents who have experienced 
flooding and whose representations of nature, home and society have been fractured 
respond with feelings of increased anxiety rather than with practical protective measures. 
Freddy, for example, claims that his mental health has been brought to the edge of 
collapse by his awareness of the fragility of the security of „home‟ (see above). Similarly, 
Sally, a 37 year-old single professional – who, like Freddy, twice had to be evacuated 
from her home – says that she now becomes “panicky” and “hysterical” when she 
considers the possibility that this experience will one day be repeated. 
 
Although some, therefore, may react to the loss of the safe representation of „home‟ by 
taking action to protect their home, others lose their sense of ontological security and 
may, in consequence, experience a weakening of their mental health.  
Conclusion 
In circumstances of uncertainty, continued awareness of the risk of an infrequent event is 
likely to lead to long-term, debilitating anxiety (Selye 1956; cited in Cox 1978). Even in 
some of the most at risk areas of the UK, floods are expected to occur only about once in 
75 years. Furthermore, the provenance of floods and methods for damage mitigation are 
complex and are hard for the layperson to understand. The mental suppression, by 
householders, of awareness of this risk can therefore be seen as instrumentally rational, 
for it protects their ontological security and hence, also, their mental health. 
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As we have seen, however, the strategies used to suppress this awareness also de-
legitimise the discourse of household-level flood-risk mitigation and therefore reduce the 
likelihood that householders will take any practical steps to prepare for flood events. In 
other words, there is a conflict between measures that protect physical security – safety in 
Maslow‟s hierarchy – and those that protect ontological security – esteem in Maslow‟s 
hierarchy. 
 
This suggests that the discourse of flood-risk mitigation will gain a firmer foothold 
amongst the at-risk public only if there is a reduction in the perceived risk of 
relinquishing the social representations that depict „home‟ as innately safe, „nature‟ as 
innately benign and the state as an innately competent and willing protector.  
 
One way of reducing this perceived risk might be to reduce uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of mitigation measures. Doubts over which measure to take exacerbate 
anxiety about regret and increase the likelihood of inaction (see Zeelenberg et al 2002 on 
the inaction effect) – especially where, as is the case with flood risk, this is anyway the 
norm (see Tykocinski and Pittman 1998). Furthermore, there is a precedent for the 
provision of such advice, for in the UK the police and fire services already offer expert, 
individually tailored guidance on the prevention of burglaries and fires.  
 
As regards risk research in general, by highlighting the importance of anxiety and 
ontological security for risk response, this article makes an argument for greater 
consideration of the role of emotions. Although risk researchers have become 
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increasingly aware of the significance of emotions (Slovic 2000; 2004), more needs to be 
done to understand how emotional considerations influence responses to natural hazards. 
As emotions are primary to rational thought and do not necessarily enter consciousness, 
this implies the need for a methodological shift towards research methods that look 
beneath the superficial meanings of what people say and explore the representations and 
discourses that shape their speech and actions. 
 24 
Bibliography 
 
ABRAMS, D. & HOGG, M. (1990) An introduction to the social identity approach 
(Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf). 
ADAMS, J. (1995) Risk (London, UCL Press). 
AUSTIN, J. (1962) How to do Things with Words (Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
BILLIG, M. (1993) Studying the thinking society: social representations, rhetoric and 
attitudes, in: G. M. BREAKWELL AND D. CANTER (Eds.) Empirical Approaches to 
Social Representations. Second ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press). 
COATES, L. (1999) Flood Fatalities in Australia, 1788-1996. Australian Geographer, 
30, pp. 391-408. 
COOPER, C. (1976) The house as symbol of the self, in: H. M. PROSHANSKY, W. H. 
ITTELSON AND L. G. RIVLIN (Eds) Environmental Psychology: People and their 
Settings. Second ed. New York, Hold, Rinehart and Winston. 
COX, T. (1978). Stress (Basingstoke: MacMillan). 
DOUGLAS, M. (1991) The idea of home: a kind of space, Social Research, 58, pp. 287-
307. 
DUPUIS, A. & THORNS, D. C. (1998) Home, home ownership and the search for 
ontological security, The Sociological Review, 46, pp. 24-47. 
 25 
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (2003) Thames Gateway and Flood Risk Management – 
A Preliminary Assessment (London, Environment Agency). 
EVANS E, ASHLEY R, HALL J, PENNING-ROWSELL E, SAUL A, SAYERS P, 
THORNE C AND WATKINSON A. (2004) Foresight. Future Flooding. Scientific 
Summary: Volume I. Future risks and their drivers. Office of Science and 
Technology: London. 
FAIRCLOUGH, N. (2003) Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social 
Research (London, Routledge). 
FESTINGER, L. (1957) A theory of cognitive dissonance (Stanford, CA, Stanford 
University Press).  
GIDDENS, A. (1991) Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge, Polity Press). 
GREGORY, J. C. (1999) The Nature of Laughter (London, Routledge). 
GRICE, P. (1975) Logic and conversation, in: COLE, P. & MORGAN, J. (Eds) Syntax 
and Semantics, 3: Speech Acts (New York, Academic Press). 
GROTHMAN T. AND REUSSWIG F. (2006) People at risk of flooding: Why some 
residents take precautionary action while others do not, Natural Hazards, 38, 1-2. 
HAJER, M. (1995) The Politics of Environmental Discourse (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press). 
HAJER, M. (2002) Discourse analysis and the study of policy making, European 
Political Sciences, Autumn 2002. 
 26 
HALLIDAY, M. (1973) Explorations in the Functions of Language (London, Edward 
Arnold). 
HALLIDAY, M. (1994) An Introduction to Functional Grammar (London, Edward 
Arnold). 
HARRIES, T. (2008). Householder responses to flood risk: The consequences of the 
search for ontological security. PhD Thesis. Enfield, London: Flood Hazard Research 
Centre, Middlesex University. 
HEWITT, K. (1983) The idea of calamity in a technocratic age, in: K. HEWITT (Ed) 
Interpretations of Calamity: From the Viewpoint of Human Ecology (London: Allen 
& Unwin). 
HOGG, M. & ABRAMS, D. (1988) Social Identification: A Social Psychology of 
Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London, Routledge). 
KATES R W. (1962) Hazard and Choice Perception in Flood Plain Management 
Research Paper Number 78 (Chicago, Illinois, Department of Geography). 
LINDELL M. K. AND PERRY R. W. (2000) Household Adjustment to Earthquake 
Hazard: a Review of Research, Environment and Behavior, 32, 4, pp. 461-501. 
MACNAGHTEN, P. & URRY, J. (1995) Towards a Sociology of Nature, Sociology, 29, 
2, pp. 203-220. 
MCKINLAY, A., POTTER, J. & WETHERELL, M. (1993) Discourse analysis and 
social representations, in: G. M. BREAKWELL AND D. V. CANTER (Eds) Empirical 
Approaches to Social Representations (Oxford, Clarendon Press). 
 27 
MASLOW, A. H. (1943) A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological Review, 50, 
370-396.  
MORREALL, J. (1983) Taking Laughter Seriously (Albany, SUNY Pr). 
MOSCOVICI, S. (1961) La Psychanalyse: Son Image et son Public (Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France). 
MOSCOVICI, S. (1984) The phenomenon of social representations, in: R. FARR AND S. 
MOSCOVICI (Eds) Social Representations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). 
MULKAY, M. (1988) On Humour: Its Nature and its Place in Modern Society 
(Oxford, Polity Press). 
OHL, C. A. & TAPSELL, S. M. (2000) Flooding and Human Health: The dangers posed 
are not always obvious, British Medical Journal, 321, pp. 1167-1168. 
PENNING-ROWSELL E. (1976). The Effect of Flood Damage on Land Use Planning, 
Geographia Polonica, 34, 139-153. 
POTTER, J. & WETHERELL, M. (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond 
Attitudes and Behaviour (London, Sage). 
RAMSBOTTOM, D., FLOYD, P. & PENNING-ROWSELL, E. (2004) Flood Risks to 
People, Phase 2: Inception Report, (Wallingford, UK, HR Wallingford). 
RISK & POLICY ANALYSISTS LTD, FLOOD HAZARD RESEARCH CENTRE, 
EFTEC & CASPAR (2004) The Appraisal of Human-Related Intangible Impacts of 
Flooding (London, Defra). 
 28 
SATTLER D. N., KAISER C. F. AND HITTNER J. B. (2000) Disaster Preparedness: 
Relationships among Private Experience, Personal Characteristics, and Distress, Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 30, 7, 1396-1420. 
SIMS J. H. & BAUMANN, D. D. (1983) Educational Programs and Human Response to 
Natural Hazards, Environment and Behaviour, 15, 2, pp. 165-189. 
SLOVIC P. (2000). Introduction and Overview, in: P. SLOVIC (Ed) The Perception of 
Risk (London, Earthscan). 
SLOVIC P., FINUCANE M., PETERS E. AND MACGREGOR D. G. (2004) Risk as 
Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and 
Rationality, Risk Analysis, 24, 2. 
TAPSELL, S. & TUNSTALL, S. (2001) The Health and Social Effects of the June 
2000 Flooding in The North East Region (Enfield, Flood Hazard Research Centre). 
TAPSELL, S., TUNSTALL, S., PENNING-ROWSELL, E. & HANDMER, J. W. (1999) 
The Health Effects of the 1998 Easter Flooding in Banbury and Kidlington (Enfield, 
Flood Hazard Research Centre). 
TAPSELL, S., TUNSTALL, S. & WILSON, T. (2003) Banbury and Kidlington Four 
Years after the Floods: An Examination of the Long-Term Health Effects of 
Flooding (Enfield, Flood Hazard Research Centre). 
TUNSTALL, S., TAPSELL, S., GREEN, C., FLOYD, P. & GEORGE, C. (2006) The 
Health Effects of Flooding: Social Research Results from England and Wales, Journal of 
Water and Health, 4, 3, pp. 365-380. 
 29 
TUAN, Y.-F. (1974) Space and place: Humanistic perspective, Progress in Geography, 
6, pp. 233-246. 
TYKOCINSKI, O. & PITTMAN, T. (1998). The consequences of doing nothing: 
Inaction inertia as avoidance of anticipated counterfactual regret. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 75(3), pp. 607-616. 
VAN DEN BERG, A. E. & TER HEIJNE, M. (2005) Fear versus fascination: An 
exploration of emotional responses to natural threats, Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 25, pp. 261-272. 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1958) Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Basil Blackwell). 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION (2002) Floods: Climate Change and 
Adaptation Strategies for Human Health, Meeting report (Copenhagen, WHO 
Regional Office for Europe). 
ZEELENBERG, M., VAN DEN BOS, K., VAN DIJK, E. & PIETERS, R. (2002). The 
inaction effect in the psychology of regret. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 82(3), pp. 314-327. 
 30 
Figure 1 Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Physiology
Safety
Love/belonging
Esteem
Self-actualisation
Food, water, sex etc
Security of health, of body, of property etc
Friendship, family, sexual intimacy
Self-esteem, confidence,
respect etc
Creativity,
spontaneity,
morality etc
 
 
Maslow‟s hierarchy of needs, shown as a pyramid, with the prioritized needs at 
the bottom. (Based on Maslow 1943). 
 
